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Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: A Foolproof
Mechanism for Avoiding Payment of Civil
Penalties Arising out of Criminal Conduct?
Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire)'
"Hard cases make bad law." Every young legal scholar sees an
illustration of this axiom at least once during the first year of law school.
Inevitably, during the discussion of such a case, a frustrated student will raise
a hand and proclaim, "But professor, isn't the court.wrong?" Many of these
"wrong" decisions are wrong merely because existing law does not dictate
such results. Nevertheless, one who reads these decisions will agree that
justice often has been served, and sometimes the decisions will lead to a
change in the law.
The present case can be viewed as an example of how a court, when
faced with a compelling factual situation, can interpret existing law in a way
to achieve what the court perceives is a just result. The debtor' LeMaire,
viciously and repeatedly shot Handeen, nearly killing him.2 After serving a
brief period in jail and losing a civil suit for damages, LeMaire filed for
bankruptcy protection. Can a debtor file bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code and thus avoid fully compensating his victim? The
Bankruptcy Code appears to allow such a result.4 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, held otherwise in the case that is the subject of this
Note.5
This Note is comprised of four sections. The first section will set forth
the facts of the case and the conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit. The
second section examines the existing state of the law in this area. The third
section relates the findings and reasoning used by the court in making its
decision. The last section critically examines the decision and its ramifica-
tions.
1. 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) [hereinafter LeMaire II].
2. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989),
reh'g granted, vacated, 891 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter LeMaire 1].
3. Id.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a), 523(a)(5), 1322(b)(5), (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
5. Lemaire 11, 898 F.2d at 1346.
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I. FACTS AND HOLDING
The defendant, Handeen, was a judgment creditor of the debtor, LeMaire.
Handeen objected to the bankruptcy court's confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
that would have discharged the judgment obtained as a result of LeMaire's
intentional assault on Handeen.6 In July 1978, LeMaire fired nine shots at
point blank range at Handeen. Five of the nine shots struck Handeen and
nearly killed him.7
Handeen initially objected to the Chapter 13 plan, claiming it was not
proposed in good faith.8 The bankruptcy court denied the objection and
confirmed the plan on November 12, 1987. 9 On appeal, the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's order.'0 On further appeal, an Eighth Circuit
Panel again affirmed the bankruptcy court's order." The present case and
subsequent opinion arose when the Eighth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc,
vacated the panel's opinion, and reversed.
1 2
Handeen presented two arguments why the bankruptcy court should reject
LeMaire's proposed Chapter 13 plan. First, he argued that his judgment,
which arose from an infliction of "willful and malicious injury by the debtor,"
could not be discharged as a matter of law.'3 The court rejected this
argument because the Bankruptcy Code's statutory language does not include
this type of debt in its list of non-dischargeable debts under a Chapter 13
plan.14 Second, Handeen argued that the court should reject the plan because
6. Id. at 1347 ("Handeen brought a civil suit against LeMaire and obtained a
consent judgment. LeMaire paid $3,000 of the judgment, but made no further
payments, prompting Handeen to commence garnishment proceedings to collect the
$50,362.50 balance on the judgment.").
7. Lemaire I, 883 F.2d at 1375.
8. Id. at 1376. The plan provided for payment to creditors of approximately 42%
of their claims. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lemaire II, 898 F.2d at 1347.
12. Id. at 1347-48.
13. Id. at 1348. This argument is based on 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988 & Supp.
I 1989), which does not allow the discharge of a debt that arose from the willful and
malicious infliction of injury by the debtor on another person. The court points out,
however, that this provision only applies to bankruptcies filed under Chapter 7. Id.
14. Id. at 1348. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989) provides for a
discharge of all debts except: (i) debts arising out of an alimony, support or
maintenance obligation; and (ii) debt obligations in which the last'payment is due after
the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.
[Vol. 56
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LeMaire did not propose it in good faith as required by the Bankruptcy
Code. i" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this argument in
holding that under these particular facts and circumstances, 16 "LeMaire did
not demonstrate the requisite good faith to seek Chapter 13 protection," and
thus the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith was clearly erroneous."
The court primarily based its determination on the pre-filing conduct exhibited
by LeMaire. 18 This pre-filing conduct consisted of (i) the viciousness of the
original attack, (ii) the failure to list a contingent debt, and (iii) a note
executed by LeMaire to his parents on the eve of bankruptcy.' 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The principle goals of bankruptcy are to provide the debtor with a fresh
start, and to provide the creditors with an equitable distribution of the debtor's
estate.20 Courts constantly try to balance these competing goals.21
Congress has provided certain advantages to individuals who file a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. These advantages are designed to encourage
payment plans under Chapter 13 rather than liquidation under Chapter 7.22
One such advantage is that under a Chapter 13 plan certain debts are
dischargeable, whereas under a Chapter 7 liquidation the same d6bts would
not be dischargeable. Chapter 13 provides in part:
As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts
provided for by the plan... except any debt-
15. LeMaire II, 898 F.2d at 1348. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988) provides that
before a plan can be confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the plan must be proposed in
good faith.
16. The court was careful to limit their holding to this particular case by stating,
"our decision should not be read as a broad declaration extending beyond the facts
before us." LeMaire I, 898 F.2d at 1353.
17. Id. at 1353.
18. Id. at 1352.
19. Id. at 1351-52.
20. In re Swan, 98 Bankr. 502, 505 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
21. Id. at 505.
22. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988) (debtor gets a period of time to cure
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(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title;' or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.24
Under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, not only are alimony and child support
obligations non-dischargeable, but tax assessments and debts obtained by false
pretenses are also nondischargeable.2z Obviously, if the debts are comprised
primarily of a Chapter 7 nondischargeable type, it would be to the debtor's ad-
vantage to file a Chapter 13 plan rather than a Chapter 7. This advantage was
designed by Congress to lure debtors into Chapter 13. Congress reasoned that
a Chapter 13 arrangement would reap a greater distribution for creditors, but
at the same time allow debtors to keep assets while paying debts over an
extended period.
For a plan to be confirmed under Chapter 13, the plan must meet certain
criteria. These criteria are set forth in 11 U.S.C. section 1325, which provides
in part:
(a) the court shall confirm a plan if -...
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law; .... 26
This "good faith" requirement is the most abstract of all the criteria required
by the statute and consequently courts have interpreted it in many different
ways. 27 Courts have found "good faith" lacking in a number of different
contexts, including but not limited to (i) inaccurate or fraudulent disclosure of
debts and expenses by the debtor,28 (ii) plans that propose minimal amounts
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988) applies to a debt that has payments scheduled
on a date after the end date specified in the plan.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. I 1989) provides that debts involving
alimony or child support are not dischargeable.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
27. In re Easley, 72 Bankr. 948, 950 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) ("More than 300
reported 'good faith' decisions form a maze of rules and exceptions swallowing rules.
Nearlyidentical fact patterns have produced inconsistent results within judicial districts
and across the circuits. The reported decisions demonstrate that 'good faith' is an
illusive statutory description of the limits of Chapter 13 relief.").
28. In re Davis, 68 Bankr. 205, 217 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) ("The debtors...
engaged in wrongful conduct in misstating their debts and assets. Their budget
contains items which could clearly be found not reasonably necessary for themselves
or their dependents [sic] . . . . The combination of all these factors constitutes
questionable conduct, a desire to manipulate the Bankruptcy Code and evidence of bad
faith that cannot receive this court's approval.").
[Vol. 56
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for repayment of creditors,29 and (iii) situations where the debt was procured
through fraud.30 One of the primary reasons for such a wide range of judi-
cial interpretations is the lack of congressional guidance.3' To assist
bankruptcy judges, the Eighth Circuit in In re Estus 32 suggested the follow-
ing factors when making the good faith determination:
(1) the amount of thd proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's
surplus income;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future
increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and
percentage repayment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are
an attempt to mislead the court;
(5) the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is
non-dischargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical
expenses;
29. In re Swan, 98 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (plan proposing repayment
of $90 on an $8,000 civil judgment was not in good faith); In re Kourtakis, 75 Bankr.
183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (plan proposing repayment of 24% on a $38,959.50 civil
judgment was not in good faith); In re Chase, 28 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983)
(plan proposing repayment of less than 1/5 of a $25,000 consent judgment was not in
good faith); But see Note, Discharge of Debt Under Chapter 13: The Eighth Circuit's
Failure to Balance a Debtor's Right to a Fresh Start Against a Victim's Right to
Compensation, 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 99, 113 (1990), where the author points out that
in 1984 Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1988), which removed minimum
repayment as a "good faith" factor. Section 1325(b)(1) provides that if a creditor
objects, the bankruptcy court cannot confirm a plan in which the creditor will not
receive either full payment or a portion of all of the debtor's projected disposable
income to be received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan.
30. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982).
In Whitman, the court found good faith lacking where "a debtor... obtain[s] money,
services or products from a seller by larceny, fraud or other forms of dishonesty and
then keep[s] his gain by filing a Chapter 13 petition within a few days of the wrong."
Id. This would allow "the debtor to profit from his own wrong .. . through the
Chapter 13 process." Id. See also LeMaire 11, 898 F.2d at 1357 n.15.
31. "Because the good faith requirement of section 1325(a)(3) is neither defined
in the Bankruptcy Code nor discussed in the legislative history, courts have struggled
to set appropriate parameters for the requisite inquiry into the debtor's motives and
intentions in proposing a Chapter 13 plan." LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1377-78.
32. 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).
1991]
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(9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief;
and
(11) the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the
trustee.33
The Estus court was careful to point out that these were not the only
factors to be considered, but all relevant facts should be considered and good
faith should be determined on a case by case basis.34 Thus, the court was
adopting a totality of the circumstances approach.35 The test requires that
"[i]f, after weighing all the facts and circumstances, the plan is determined to
constitute an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of Chapter 13,
confirmation must be denied. 36
After the Estus opinion, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,37 which added new Code section
1325(b). The section provides in part:
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to
the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan
unless, as of the effective date of the plan -
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of
such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income
to be received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the
plan.38
In Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner,39 the court acknowledged that
section 1325(b) subsumed or modified many of the Estus factors, but pointed
out that the good faith inquiry is still important.4° The court noted that a
"bankruptcy court must look at factors such as whether the debtor has stated
his debts and expenses accurately; whether he has made any fraudulent
misrepresentation to mislead the bankruptcy court; or whether he has unfairly




37. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1988).
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manipulated the Bankruptcy Code."'" As a result, the inquiry will be the
same as in Estus except for considerations relating to the amount of payment
to creditors.' 2
Courts that addressed the issue of good faith in a proposed Chapter 13
plan where the debtor's debts consisted of a Chapter 7 non-dischargeable debt
agree that this fact alone does not constitute a lack of good faith on the part
of the debtor.4 3 Rather, as pointed out in Estus, this is but one factor to con-
sider.44 Some courts have considered the pre-filing conduct of the debtor in
determining good faith. In these cases, the conduct being evaluated typically
has been the debtor's actions ir filing the petition, not the conduct that caused
the debt to arise.45
Finally, a bankruptcy court's determination of "good faith" is a finding
of fact and can only be overturned if clearly erroneous. 46 As indicated
above, determining whether a bankruptcy petition has been proposed in good
faith is very subjective and there are no bright line rules.47 Consequently,
each bankruptcy court has broad discretion to make the determination of good
faith.48 "This test [good faith], which is admittedly inexact, must necessarily
be applied on a case by case basis with the final determination left to the
sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.
49
41. Id.
42. Id. See also supra note 33.
43. See LeMaire 11, 898 F.2d at 1352; In re Okoree-Baah, 836 F.2d 1030, 1032
(6th Cir. 1988); In re Swan, 98 Bankr. 502, 504 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) ("A debtor's
proposal to discharge a debt not dischargeable in a chapter 7 case is not by itself a
sufficient reason to find that a debtor's plan was filed in bad faith."); In re Kourtakis,
75 Bankr. 183, 186 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Easley, 72 Bankr. 948, 951
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Chase, 28 Bankr. 814, 819 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 43 Bankr. 939, 944 (D. Md. 1984).
44. Estus, 695 F.2d at 317.
45. See LeMaire 11, 898 F.2d at 1351-52; Okoree-Baah, 836 F.2d at 1032-34;
Kourtakis, 75 Bankr. at 187.
46. See LeMaire II, 898 F.2d at 1349; EducationalAssistance Corp., 827 F.2d at
1224.
47. Okoree-Baah, 836 F.2d at 1033, ("Good faith is an amorphous notion, largely
defined by factual inquiry. In a good faith analysis, the infinite variety of factors
facing any particular debtor must be weighed carefully. We cannot here promulgate
any precise formulae or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith
equation.").
48. Id. ("The bankruptcy court must ultimately determine whether the debtor's
plan, given his or her individual circumstances, satisfies the purposes undergirding
chapter 13 .... The decision should be left simply to the bankruptcy court's common
sense and judgment.").
49. In re Raines, 33 Bankr. 379, 381 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
.8091991]
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III. INSTANT DECISION
The majority opinion in LeMaire first reviewed the findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the bankruptcy court, which in turn had
previously been reviewed by the district court and a panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.5 These prior courts found that LeMaire's plan,
which provided for payment of approximately forty-two percent of creditor's
claims, had been proposed in good faith.51 Then, the court addressed the two
arguments advanced by Handeen as to why LeMaire's bankruptcy plan should
not have been confirmed. 2
First, Handeen claimed that LeMaire was not entitled to a discharge of
the debt because the debt arose from a criminal assault.53 Handeen relied on
11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(6), which provides an exception to discharge for a
debt that arises out of willful or malicious injury.' The court recognized
that the intentional tort in this case qualified as an infliction of willful and
malicious injury. The court also noted, however, that this exception to
diicharge contained in section 523(a)(6) only applies to Chapter 7 plans.55
In his second argument, Handeen claimed that the Chapter 13 plan should
not be confirmed because it was not proposed in good faith as required by
section 1325(a)(3).56 The court began its analysis by noting thatCongress
did not address good faith when it enacted the statute. 7 Therefore, the court
had to make the good faith determination using the "totality of the circum-
stances approach" and applying the Estus factors. 8 The Estus factors that the
court found particularly important to the facts of this case included (i) "the
type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is non-dis-
chargeable in Chapter 7;" and (ii) "the motivation and sincerity of the debtor
in seeking Chapter 13 relief."
5 9
The majority decided that the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith
was clearly erroneous because the court gave insufficient weight to the two
Estus factors mentioned above.' The court found that the bankruptcy court
"did not properly consider the strong public policy factors, inherent in the
50. LeMaire HI, 898 F.2d at 1347-48.
51. Id. at 1347.




56. Id. Handeen was referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988). Id.
57. LeMaire 11, 898 F.2d at 1348.
58. Id. at 1349. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1350.
[Vol. 56
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Bankruptcy Code which are implicated in discharging the debt."' The court,
however, did not discuss what these policies might be.62
The court then proffered three more facts that demonstrate a lack of good
faith. They are (i) the heinous nature of the crime underlying the debt,63 (ii)
the failure to list on the debtor's schedule of debts a contingent liability
arising out of student loans," and (iii) the execution of a promissory note to
his parents on the eve of bankruptcy.65 The majority found that the
bankruptcy court did not consider whether LeMaire attempted to unfairly
manipulate the Bankruptcy Code and indicated that a finding of this nature
should have been made.6
Public policy was mentioned twice as a justification for the decision, but
the court did not articulate what this public policy was.67 The majority con-
cluded that under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the bankruptcy
court's finding of good faith was clearly erroneous.
68
The dissent argued that the majority opinion relied on its own perception
of what public policies should be promoted to find that LeMaire did not pro-
pose the, plan in good faith.69 The dissent began by explaining that section
1325(a)(3) only mandates that the debtor propose the plan in good faith, and
not that the debtor acted in good faith when the debt was incurred.70 Thus,
the court should not consider the viciousness of the crime in determining
whether the debt arising out of the crime was incurred in good faith.7' The
dissent further argued that the mere presence of a Chapter 7 non-dischargeable
debt does not automatically mean that a Chapter 13 plan was proposed in bad
faith.72
The dissent also argued that the majority ignored many of the findings
made by the bankruptcy court that the bankruptcy court used in its determina-
tion of good faith.73 The majority did not defer to the bankruptcy court's
findings, even though these findings rested in large part on credibility determi-
61. Id. at 1351-53.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1352.
64. Id. at 1351.
65. Id. at 1352 n.6.
66. Id. at 1351.
67. Id. at 1353.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1353-61 (Magill, J., dissenting).
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nations.74 The dissent also took issue with the majority's treatment of the
contingent debt and the promissory note to LeMaire's parents as indicators of
good faith.75 The dissent pointed out that LeMaire fully disclosed the
contingent debt in his testimony at trial, and that the bankruptcy court
specifically found there had been no collusion between the debtor and his
parents.76 The dissent argued that the majority ignored the bankruptcy
court's finding of "proper motivation and sincerity" merely because the
majority would have decided the case for Handeen, invoking public policy
considerations to justify such a decision.77
IV. COMMENT
This Comment proposes that the LeMaire court made the wrong decision.
First, the Bankruptcy Code clearly provides that debts arising out of an
intentional tort are dischargeable in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. 8
Second, the bankruptcy court found that the plan had been proposed in "good
faith. 7 9 This finding was not clearly erroneous. Few people will argue that
the result reached in LeMaire was unjust. The problem, however, is that
while the result was perhaps just, it was not dictated by existing law, which
mandates confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan absent a finding of a lack of good
faith. 0 Perhaps Congress will respond by amending the Code and making
debts arising out of intentional torts nondischargeable in Chapter 13 as well
as Chapter 7. But as the law is currently written, these debts are discharge-
able in a Chapter 13 proceeding.
As determined by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court
and an Eighth Circuit panel, there was no indication that the plan filed by
LeMaire was not proposed in good faith.8 ' The bankruptcy court made
exclusive findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the filing of
LeMaire's Chapter 13 plan.82 The bankruptcy court then applied the Estus
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1358 n.17.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1356.
78. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
79. LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1379.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988). This statute requires a court to confirm a Chapter
13 plan if a number of factors are met. In this case, the only factor at issue was
whether the plan had been proposed in good faith. Id.
81. LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1379-80.
82. The bankruptcy court found that the expenses listed by LeMaire as necessary
for his support were reasonable. LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1380. The bankruptcy court
also found "that LeMaire, after serving his sentence, is getting back on his feet both
[Vol. 56
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factors to these findings and found that the plan was proposed in good
faith. 3
The court found that the omission of a contingent liability for student
loans from the debtor's schedule of debts, the execution of a promissory note
to the debtor's parents on the eve of bankruptcy, and the viciousness of the
assault perpetrated upon Handeen, were sufficient to constitute bad faith on
the part of LeMaire.' The omission of the debt, however, was inadvertent
and fully disclosed in the bankruptcy court by the debtor,85 and the execution
of the note on the eve of bankruptcy was evaluated by the bankruptcy court
and .allowed in part and disallowed in part.86 The above two findings
indicate that the bankruptcy court was fully aware of any suspicious pre-filing
conduct of LeMaire and considered it in evaluating good faith. Considering
the difficulty of an appellate court finding the decision of the court below
clearly erroneous, the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith in the face of
the first two contentions is not "unreasonable" and thus is not clearly
erroneous.
87
Thus, the viciousness of the assault is the only basis for finding a lack
of good faith. This is clearly not supported by the case law, as the mere
presence of a Chapter 7 nondischargeable debt is not sufficient, by itself, to
support a finding of bad faith.' The reasoning behind the court's conclusion
is public policy; however, the court never divulges what this public policy
might be.89 The only public policy that could support such a finding is that
professionally and financially, that the plan proposes to repay a significant portion of
the judgment, and that LeMaire and his parents will make substantial sacrifices under
the plan." Id. Finally, the bankruptcy court stated: "I feel that he [LeMaire] has
made a wholehearted attempt to pay Handeen as much as he is able, which turns out
to be a significant amount. Under these circumstances, I find that his motivation is
proper and his sincerity real." Id. (quoting Handeen v. LeMaire, No. 4-87-164, slip
op. at 13 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987)).
83. Id. at 1379-80.
84. LeMaire II, 898 F.2d at 1351.
85. Id. at 1359 (Magill, J., dissenting).
86. LeMaire I, 883 F.2d at 1375 n.4.
87. See LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1379 ("The bankruptcy court, having had the
benefit of several hearings and testimony from the parties, is uniquely qualified to
judge the credibility of the debtor and to ascertain his motivation. We must affirm the
bankruptcy court's finding of good faith so long as the court's findings are reasonable
in light of the evidence and are supported by law."). See also In re Branding Iron
Motel, Inc., 798 F.2d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1986).
88. LeMaire II, 898 F.2d at 1357 (Magill, J., dissenting); In re Smith, 848 F.2d
813, 818 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Chaffim, 816 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1987) modified
by 836 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); Educational Assistance Corp., 827 F.2d at 1227.
89. LeMaire II, 898 F.2d at 1351.
1991]
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criminals should not be able to escape debts arising from their criminal acts
because this would further promote criminal acts.
A recent Supreme Court decision recognizes that Congress may have
considered such a policy when enacting the Bankruptcy Code.90 "Congress
could well have concluded that ... a debtor's interest in full and complete
release of his obligations outweighs society's interest in collecting or
enforcing a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the Chapter
13 plan."91  The Supreme Court recognized that "the statutory language
plainly reveals Congress' intent not to except restitution orders from discharge
in certain Chapter 13 proceedings."92 This intent was ascertained by reading
the language of 11 U.S.C. section 1328(a) and noting that debts arising out of
criminal restitution orders are not among the exceptions to discharge.93
If Congress believed that the policy against discharging debts arising
from intentional wrongs was so important, then it could have changed the
statute to reflect this view.94 Congress chose not to change this portion of
the statute.95 Congress has shown that it is willing to make changes when
it perceives the need, as evidenced by the recent change that does not allow
the dischargeability of student loans.96  Further, Congress has recently
enacted several other new amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. 97 Although
some of the amendments involve dischargeability of particular debts in a
90. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990).
Davenport dealt with the dischargeability in Chapter 13 of a criminal restitution
obligation, and the court found that such a debt was dischargeable. Id. at 2129. See
also Comment, Recent Amendments, infra, note 97.
91. Id. at 2132.
92. Id. at 2133.
93. Id.
94. See In re Kourtakis, 75 Bankr. 183, 186 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ("Congress
could easily have provided for the Chapter 13 nondischargeability of debts incurred by
fraud or by willful and malicious injury, but it did not. Significantly, Congress did
provide for the Chapter 13 nondischargeability of two other kinds of debts. See 11
U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988). This court cannot and will not infer or create any additional
classes of nondischargeable debt in Chapter 13.").
95. Congress had an opportunity to make any other desired changes when, in
1984, it addressed proposed changes in the area of Chapter 13 confirmation which
resulted in the adoption of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. I 1989), originally enacted in 1984,
basically provides, subject to a few exceptions, for the non-dischargeability of debts
that arise out of student loans.
97. See Comment, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code-A Politically
MotivatedLess Fresh Start, 56 Mo. L. REV. 705 (1991) [hereinafter Comment, Recent
Amendments], for a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments.
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DEBTS FROM INTENTIONAL TORTS
Chapter 13 proceeding, none of them relate to the dischargeability or
nondischargeability of debts arising from intentional torts.
The majority in LeMaire followed the advice of the dissent in the earlier
panel opinion98 and engaged in judicial activism to avoid the express
language of the statute and bring about a result that appears just.99 "Courts
that have been unwilling to confirm Chapter 13 plans have used the peg of
good faith upon which to hang their disapproval. " 01 ° Achieving a just result,
however, should not be a reason to ignore the law, which clearly allows the
discharge in Chapter 13 of debts arising out of an intentional tort.' '
-The practical effect of the court's finding is that the debt arising out of
the assault will not be discharged because the plan will not be confirmed.
Therefore, the majority disallowed the discharge of the debt because of the
origin of the debt, rather than because the plan is defective. 02 As a result,
because of the kind of debt in question, LeMaire is effectively barred from
using Chapter 13.
The ramifications of this decision are hard to gauge. Certainly, at least
in the Eighth Circuit, debtors must be aware of the possibility that their plan
will not be confirmed if it involves discharging a debt that arises out of an
intentional assault or any other criminal conduct. Finding a lack of good faith
will not be automatic; the court was careful not to adopt a bright line rule and
hold that any time a debt arises out of criminal conduct the Chapter 13 plan
is "per se" proposed in bad faith.'03 The court still advocates deciding each
case using a totality of the circumstances test,1' 4 but again, the crucial
circumstance in determining good faith might well be the presence of a debt
that arose from a heinous, criminal assault.
Legal scholars can only hope that Congress can articulate these strong
policies against discharging debts that arise from criminal assaults by
98. LeMaire 1, 883 F.2d at 1381 (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("While much of the
court's discussion reflects the body of law that has developed on the approach to
Chapter 13 cases, the court's enthusiasm in avoiding judicial activism causes it to
stand justice on its head.").
99. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100. In re Chase, 28 Bankr. 814,816 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) rev'd, 43 Bankr. 739
(D.C. Md. 1984).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988).
102. See, e.g., In re Easley, 72 Bankr. 948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) ("[G]ood
faith cannot be defined as 'the absence of any conduct thatwould traditionally have
barred discharge, without rendering Chapter 13's discharge provision nugatory."') Id.
at 952 (quoting In re Ringale, 669 F.2d 426, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1982)).
103. LeMaire I1, 898 F.2d at 1353.
104. Id. at 1349.
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amending the Bankruptcy Code. Congress should take the advice of the
Chase court and enact new legislation that will "eliminate the free lunch.111 5
KEVIN SULLIVAN
105. In re Chase, 28 Bankr. 814, 819 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) rev'd, 43 Bankr. 739
(D.C. Md. 1984).
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